H5N1 Bird Flu Research
Sparks Concerns for National Security
The balance between scientific truths and national security was weighed
at a Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing
Thursday to look at policies that guide the publication of potentially
lethal research – known as dual-use research of concern.
A recent controversy involving separate research by a U.S. team and a
Dutch team on the deadly bird flu H5N1 virus sparked interest in the
issue. The independent National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)
concluded that neither team’s research should be made public because of
itspotential security risks. Several months later, it reversed itself.
An NSABB member then challenged the final decision as having been
“biased toward finding a solution that was a lot less about a robust
science-and-policy-based risk benefit analysis and more about how to get
us out of this difficult situation.”
“We want the benefits of scientific inquiry but we also need to mitigate
risks,” said CommitteeChairman Joe Lieberman, ID-Conn. “How to strike
the right balance is a tricky question. The fact that these two research
teams were able to create this new strain from existing genetic material
means that nature could create it as well. In fact, many scientists
thought that was likely. But given the lethality of the virus,
publishing the results could create huge security risks by offering a
blueprint for a deadly biological weapon to rogue states or terrorists.
Our hearing has reassured me overall that the process in place for
deciding whether to make dual use research of concern public is
satisfactory, although this is an issue that will require vigilant
oversight in the years to come.”
Ranking
Member Susan Collins, R-Maine, said: “We need a straight-forward
dialogue among science, health, national security, and government
experts and leaders in order to promote scientific research while
protecting the safety of Americans and others around the world.”
Witnesses at the hearing included Anthony Fauci, Director of the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the National
Institutes of Health; Daniel Gerstein, Deputy Under Secretary for
Science and Technology at the Department of Homeland Security; Paul Keim,
Acting Chairman of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity;
and Thomas Inglesby, Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Center
for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.